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Abstract: 
 
 
 
From Hammurabi’s Code to modern-day penitentiaries, a society’s chosen punishment models 
contribute to that society’s ethics. In Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland; or the Transformation 
(1798), characters interact with one another in an isolated community. These interactions center on 
Wieland’s murder of his family, and how his mind was influenced toward murder by Carwin, an ex-
convict.  Here, a reader is faced with deciding who to blame. However, solely focusing on criminal 
culpability ignores a rhetorical problem left unexamined by past scholars—that of criminal punishment 
in the novel. This problem involves two issues—first, the factors that motivate a society to choose 
certain punishment models, and secondly, a 21
st
 century audience’s reaction to these motives. Thus, by 
analyzing the motives for punishment models in Wieland, and how these motives relate to our society, 
I argue that a reader should finish reading the text with a desire to reform our societal institutions. 
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For critic Laura Korobkin, Wieland; or the Transformation reads as a text obsessed with this 
tension between a society’s legal structure and its people. Her article, “Murder by Madmen: Criminal 
Responsibility, Law, and Judgment in Wieland,” discusses the novel as evidence of Brown’s two 
frustrations with the law—specifically, its futile attempt to compartmentalize human interaction into 
codes of morals, and its inability to mitigate problems stemming from this human interactions. Much 
of Korobkin’s argument focuses on dismissing other critics’ interpretation of the law and its evaluation 
of evidence in Wieland.  
 She admonishes critic Michael Gilmore for his assessment of Carwin as a character who 
“acknowledges his misconduct, but… has committed no crime punishable by law.”1  Korobkin 
counters Gilmore’s assertion by offering two reasons that yield Carwin as responsible for murder—the 
first being his deliberate use of Theodore Wieland, as “an instrument of death,”2 and the second 
involving the law’s assessment of his malicious actions as meriting punishment.3  Korobkin’s second 
assertion leaves a dimension of the legal system unexamined.  Particularly, Korobkin’s argument 
provides limited examination on what happens after a verdict is decided. 
This limitation is enhanced by Clara’s and Carwin’s departure from one another in Chapter 
XXV, which creates an emotional catharsis for the reader that deters any critical thinking about a key 
problem in the text. Here, Korobkin’s article provides the starting point to explore an institution left 
mostly unexamined and embedded in the novel—that of criminal punishment.  Represented in various 
genres from the time period, three criminal punishment models in Wieland fail to ethically address and 
treat a mentally-ill offender (Wieland) as this offender navigates through each model. These 
punishment models include condemnation by public opinion, formal punishment by the justice system 
through either capital punishment or imprisonment, and self-punishment or self-harm.  These models 
                                                 
1
 Laura H Korobkin, "Murder by Madman: Criminal Responsibility, Law, and Judgment in Wieland." American Literature 72, no. 4 
(2000): 721.  
2
 Ibid., 727. 
3
 Ibid., 733. 
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operate according to unethical procedures and motives that reflect a selfish society—one obsessed with 
maintaining its reputation as civilized and economically successful, in ways that trump its concern for 
applying fair punishment.  
 
I. The Ethics of Punishment by Public Opinion 
The first punishment model, condemnation by public opinion, shows the society in Wieland as 
motivated to punish criminals due to the offenders’ crime as well as their illogical excuses for that 
crime. The novel introduces this model in Chapter XVIII, extending it into Chapter XIX.   Here, 
Clara’s uncle informs her of Wieland’s courtroom testimony.  In assessing Wieland’s testimony, an 
audience views his account and his self-proclaimed innocence as illogical, thus motivating a consensus 
on Wieland deserving punishment.  However, a reader should notice this motive for punishment as 
hypocritical and unethical, being that his illogical criminal excuses are presented to us by an illogical 
narrator.  Before noticing this though, an audience will realize the illogical arguments from Wieland 
that cause a lack of remorse for him.  
Wieland’s argument in his testimony aligns closely with an article appearing in from 1796 
entitled, “An Account of a Murder Committed by Mr. J---- Y---- on His Family in December 1781.”  
This narrative details James Yates’ murder of his family—a narrative that scholars actually 
hypothesize as the basis for Wieland.  This hypothesis stems from the Advertisement written by Brown 
at the novel’s beginning, which reads “most readers [of the novel] will probably recollect an authentic 
case, remarkably similar to that of Wieland.”4  Yates’ and Wieland’s testimonies as ‘madmen’ defer 
their culpability by using two illogical appeals—firstly, an appeal to patriarchal virtue, or acting as a 
virtuous father, and secondly, an appeal to divine virtue, or following the will of God.  These appeals 
                                                 
4
 Brown 4. 
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produce contradictions that frustrate the audience, causing them to expel the mentally-ill criminal from 
public society without being first condemned the judicial process.  
Mr. Yates employs the first appeal to patriarchal virtue in order to excuse his punishment. The 
account describes Yates as conversing in an “interesting and affectionate” tone prior to the murders, 
while simultaneously expressing fondness for his wife and caressing “his little ones alternatively.”5  
Yates discusses his past life as imbued with “domestic felicity.”6  Yates then, presents a contradiction 
to his patriarchy, and seems to suggest that the fallibility of an otherwise virtuous father resulted from 
a force other than himself. Paralleling Yates’ description as a virtuous father, Wieland insists on his 
own innocence based on his virtue in fatherhood.  While giving his testimony, he poses an inquiry and 
a statement joined together that reads, “who knows him not as a husband—as a father—as a friend? yet 
here am I arraigned as a criminal.”7  Wieland’s question and statement are posed simultaneously in an 
attempt to persuade his courtroom audience and inculcate doubt in the jury. This syntactical structure 
emphasizes the contradiction where he finds himself as both murderer and loving father. He implies 
that the audience should recognize this contradiction between his past virtue and the Court’s accusation 
as illogical, and therefore, dismiss his case.  
Still attempting to dismiss their culpability, Yates’ and Wieland’s second illogical appeal 
occurs when the men admit to their guilt, but maintain that they do not deserve punishment due to the 
divine authority influencing them to commit crime.  In making this claim, these men reject several 
forms of human compassion offered by society. A mentally-ill criminal’s rejection of this compassion 
creates confusion and causes outrage for readers. Yates’ divine appeal rejecting compassion occurs 
during a scene in the community church.  This church serves as a place to rehabilitate his criminality. 
However, he refuses to stand with his church’s congregation during prayer by using repetitive tropes 
                                                 
5 Anna. “An Account of a Murder Committed by Mr. J--Y--, upon his Family, in December, A. D. 1781.”  The New York Weekly 
Magazine.  2, no. 55. (July 1796). 
6Ibid. 
7 Brown, Wieland, 186.  
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like “obedience” and “deed” 8 to describe his decision to murder. Despite the church community’s 
attempt to compassionately include, treat, and rehabilitate him, Yates resists rehabilitation, thus 
ranking God hierarchically above any member of the human community. 
Wieland resists this human compassion as well, saying that his “obedience [to God] was the 
test of perfect virtue…”9  His testimony continues as he discusses cornering his wife during the 
murder.  Before he can lash out, she holds Wieland’s hand to her heart and asks, “Am I not thy 
wife?”(194). This questioning temporarily startles Wieland from his mission.  He describes her inquiry 
as “too much,” and that he “broke from her embrace,” just prior to murdering her (194). God 
supersedes family for both characters despite their simultaneous appeals to patriarchal roles. This 
produces a contradiction to both characters’ patriarchal virtue, as it implies their acceptance of a God 
who paradoxically commands their loved ones’ destruction.  An audience then, rejects both men’s 
pleas for mercy and justifiably condemns them. 
Despite this condemnation, an audience should still remain amiss of how to interpret each 
man’s account, as these accounts are inherently misleading and thus, unethical if used as reasoning to 
condemn Wieland and Yates.  Specifically, neither of these crime accounts comes directly from the 
criminal himself. Rather, these accounts come from an outside third-person narrator who is both 
unreliable and also mentally incompetent.  A focus on both accounts’ authorship leaves readers 
uncertain of the narrative’s accuracy and motives for punishment.  This uncertainty first arises with the 
third person narrator that conveys Mr. Yates’ first-person account. The Yates’ account starts with a 
letter to the magazine’s editor from a woman named Anna.  The letter states that the account written by 
Anna originates from “a friend, who is well acquainted with the circumstances that gave rise to it [the 
event]…”10  However, another statement implies that Anna’s friend heard this story when still a child.  
                                                 
8 Anna, “An Account of a Murder.”  
9 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland or The Transformation: (New York, NY: Penguin 1991) 200. Text references are to page numbers 
of this edition. 
10 Anna, “An Account of Murder.”  
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Anna claims that this friend writes from “what she knew of him herself, and what she heard of him 
[Yates] in her father’s family…”11  An audience then, becomes confronted with the problem of trusting 
a child story-teller whose interpretation of events may be influenced by imagination. 
The unreliable authorial perspective in the Yates’ account sheds light on Clara’s account in 
Wieland.  Clara’s uncle tells her that “one of the hearers [of Wieland’s testimony] faithfully recorded 
the speech…”12 This statement draws attention to the potential for a courtroom transcriber’s errors in 
the transcription process. Moreover, Clara acts as an unreliable narrator as evidenced by her logical 
fallacies. One such fallacy is exemplified in Chapter IX. When waiting for her love interest Pleyel to 
arrive at a play rehearsal, Clara hypothesizes irrationally about Pleyel’s whereabouts.  Clara connects 
her memory of him falling out of a canoe and nearly drowning decades ago as a child, as sufficient 
reason to believe that Pleyel encountered a similar disaster on his way to the rehearsal that day.  Thus, 
her illogical reasoning culminates in her generating a hypothesis she holds as likely true.  She notes 
that “these circumstances combined to bestow considerable plausibility on this conjecture…”13  
From these separate instances, an audience begins to ponder the accuracy of the accounts 
offered based on childhood recollection in one account and conjured-up “plausibility” in another. 
There exists an underlying probability that Wieland’s and Yates’ spoken words received modification 
by the authors, one of whom may act on imagination and false recollection during her contact with 
Yates, and another who acts mainly on fallacies throughout the novel. The narrators’ characteristics 
then, offer the possibility that the incidents themselves, or at the very least, the interpretations of 
meaning behind the incidents, may have been misconstrued. This misconstruing becomes most evident 
in the final paragraph of Yates’ account, where the narrator Anna makes two assertions regarding 
public condemnation.  
                                                 
11 Anna, “An Account of Murder.” 
12 Brown, Wieland, 94. 
13 Ibid., 185 
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To start, Anna offers two ways to think about Yates’ crime—as either influenced by insanity or 
influenced by Satan.
14
 However, Anna concedes that neither option explains the crime fully, as some 
human actions are better “concealed from us.”15  Anna’s commentary deliberately keeps motives for 
crime unexplained. Based on her commentary, societal opinion assesses only the visible acts of crime, 
rather than considering reasons for those actions. Anna’s misconstruing also presents two ethical 
choices.  In the first choice, the audience can choose to condemn the criminal based on the narrations 
by third person narrators. Condemning the criminal based on these narrations causes the audience to 
assume the same illogical reasoning and limited perspective as the narrators. This first choice sets up a 
dangerous and unethical precedent that allows a society to apply punishment based on illogical 
evidence, and an emphasis on a sort of groupthink, where a fallacy can be distorted into truth if agreed 
upon by the majority. Alternatively, the audience can reject this first choice, and instead, rely on 
selecting an option within the formal punishment model as offered by the presumably non-biased and 
government-directed judicial process.  
 
II. The Ethics of Capital Punishment  
. This formal punishment by the government is the second model seen in Wieland. Chapters 
XX and XXI of Wieland discuss the tension between two formal punishment options— capital 
punishment and imprisonment. When faced with capital punishment in his own trial, Wieland refuses 
this punishment assessed by the public.  He claims the Court leans toward unfair punishment as “they 
[the Court] doom me to death…”16  Appealing again to divine authority, he implies that only God can 
curtail life.  Clara holds this same opinion about life and death when asking her uncle Mr. Cambridge 
about Wieland’s fate after the verdict.  She holds the death penalty as “cruel and unmerited!”17  In his 
                                                 
14 Anna, “An Account of Murder.”  
15 Ibid. 
16 Brown, Wieland, 201. 
17 Ibid., 202. 
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dissertation, “Public Punishment Versus Private Judgment,” Christopher Black identifies John Locke’s 
retributive justice theories as fueling the Court’s use of capital punishment during this time period.18  
Opposing Locke’s theories, Dr. Benjamin Rush, an Early American reformer, offered a formal 
punishment model built on criminal rehabilitation. This model is detailed in two documents from the 
late 1790s and helps us understand Wieland’s condition in this punishment model.  Specifically, 
Rush’s model is discussed in his own “Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing 
Murder by Death” and the Philadelphia Society’s “Extracts and Remarks on the Subject of Punishment 
and Reformation of Criminals.”   
Within his model, Rush designated the government as responsible for criminal rehabilitation.  
Like the first punishment model, his reasoning for the model appears justified. However, Rush’s model 
simultaneously indicates a society holding two unethical motives underlying their punishment choices. 
These two motives include first, the maintaining of a favorable reputation, and secondly, the sustaining 
of a successful economy. If any audience sympathy remains for Wieland and Yates after their 
testimonies, a “reader-juror” will be thoroughly conflicted by these texts’ descriptions of the motives 
underlying formal punishment. 
Published in 1792, Rush’s “Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of Punishing Murder 
by Death,” functions to outline a need for reform based on six considerations for capital punishment. 
Furthermore, it presents the first unethical motive in formal punishment. Rush’s Consideration three, in 
which he criticizes biblical narratives and their legal systems, indicates an Early Republic concerned 
with their favorable reputation as ‘civilized,’ rather than protecting society or considering the 
criminal’s needs for rehabilitation.  Specifically, Rush critiques two biblical stories and their inability 
to justify capital punishment as appropriate in modern society. This third Consideration starts with his 
critique of two flaws in scripture law or Levitical law, which is formed from two legal traditions—the 
                                                 
18 Christopher Allan Black, “Public Punishment versus Private Judgment: Anti-Gallows Sentiment and Criminal Reform in Antebellum 
Literature 1772-1855.”  (PhD diss., Oklahoma State University, May 2012). 
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narratives of Moses (Mosaic Law) and Noah (Noahide Law).  These flaws show a society choosing a 
certain punishment option in order to avoid being classified as ‘uncivilized.’ This practice is unethical, 
in that it advocates punishment for the benefit of societal image and reputation, rather than bringing the 
criminal to justice. 
For the first flaw, Rush implies that a literal adherence to Mosaic Law promotes the death 
penalty as a too frequently used punishment. He states that, “If the Mosiac Law….be obligatory upon 
Christians, it follows that it is equally obligatory upon them to punish adultery, blasphemy…that are 
mentioned in [the law], by death” (6).  In addition, Rush asserts that the death penalty stems from an 
era where applications of punishment were outrageously disproportional to crimes.  He implies that a 
society’s progress will be deterred if they institute the death penalty in the way the prophets did. Rush 
posits punishment developed through biblical narratives as ones that take hold by the will of that 
society’s people.  Although Moses received the law from God, it is Rush’s claim that the “‘hardness of 
heart’” of a civilization, rather than God, should be held responsible for the acceptance of capital 
punishment (5).   
Thus, Rush’s first flaw would suggest an inability to punish Wieland by death, as the 
punishment indicates an uncivilized society. After this discussion, Rush transitions to the second flaw 
in Noahide Law, which presents capital punishment as being popular due to society’s inadequate 
resources.  Rush discusses this inadequacy during Noah’s time.  “Soon after the flood, the infancy and 
weakness of society rendered it impossible to punish murder by confinement,” he writes (5). Thus, 
punishment by murder existed in Noah’s time because of society’s inability to provide a legitimate 
alternative to execution with the resources it possessed in the wake of a natural disaster.  There arises 
an assumption then, that to resort to execution would be to suggest a society’s lack of resources to 
construct prisons. This lack of resources may suggest a number of parallel inferiorities in that society 
including inferiority in education systems, economic models, or limited access to raw materials. 
10 
 
Because of this, the society is represented as weak. From Consideration three, it appears that a society 
punishes by a motive to enhance its favorable representation, just as much as it punishes to protect 
citizens. 
If we adhere to Rush’s model for punishment up to this point, Yates and Wieland do not 
deserve death for their actions because of the nonsensical and barbaric nature of the death penalty and 
how this punishment reflects on a society using it. Contrary to Rush’s preference for prisons and his 
disdain for capital punishment, the literary representation of imprisonment in another piece of Brown’s 
fiction is just as horrific and inhumane as capital punishment. 
 
III. The Ethics of Imprisonment 
Imprisonment functions as the second option within the formal punishment model, and 
although appearing as an ethical alternative to capital punishment, this choice’s favorability is driven 
by the unethical economic incentives it provides a society.  In Brown’s Ormond; or the Secret Witness 
(1799), imprisonment appears to be the greater of two evils when imprisonment and the death penalty 
are offered. Constantia, the main character, discusses the horrors of prison after realizing the likelihood 
of her father’s imprisonment on debt charges.  She claims that, “the horrors of a prison had not hitherto 
been expected…it was better to die than go to prison.”19  Moreover, Wieland elaborates on this horror 
by discussing Clara’s thoughts when she prepares for her visit to Wieland’s prison.  She imagines that 
she will be unable to tolerate “the horrors of his [Wieland’s] dwelling-place, his wild yet placid 
physiology, his neglected locks…”20 Her fear of the prison shows not only her awareness of the 
physical place, but how that physical place affects those confined to it.   
Although Wieland’s “neglected looks” may be influenced by his deteriorating mind, his does 
not provide for any conditions to improve his mental stability. Following the Revolutionary War, a 
                                                 
19 Brown, Wieland, 120 
20 Brown, Wieland, 211. 
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number of reformers formed organizations to provide rehabilitative conditions.  As mentioned 
previously, the Philadelphia Society (to which Dr. Rush was a member), sought methods to reverse 
criminality in prisons and reintegrate these criminals into society.  Hence, using one of this Society’s 
texts as a lens, an audience determines that the unethical motive of economic incentive contributes to 
the decision to imprison Wieland, as Wieland’s labor fits into the prison model that could generate the 
society profit.  Thus, a prison punishes first and foremost, generates profit secondarily, and 
rehabilitates infrequently.  
  The Bishop William White, president of the Philadelphia Society, argues for imprisonment in 
the text, “Extracts and Remarks on the Subject of Punishment and Reformation of Criminals” (1790).  
This text expands on Rush’s anti-death penalty argument. The Bishop imbues his argument with an 
appeal to government authority and duty.  A sentence in the first paragraph signifies this duty, which 
reads, “To contribute comfort to the distressed, to promote reformation amongst the vicious…demand 
the consideration of every Legislature.”21 White expects government authority to implement these 
goals. His argument is structured using letters written by English prison reformers Thomas Beehov and 
John Howard —one account written on the Wymondham Bridewell and another on the Oxfordsville 
prison.  Together, both letters seem to assert that imprisonment can ‘humanize’ criminals like Wieland. 
Despite this assertion, unethical economic incentives underlie and act as the sincere motivation 
for rehabilitation in these prisons. Both letters imply that criminal rehabilitation produces two 
beneficial results—a more rational societal member and an economic producer. It appears though, that 
the economic producer holds as much or more value. First, Beehov implies that prison life will provide 
offenders with the humane conditions necessary to develop work skills. In his letter, he provides a 
“Table of Diet” for the Wymondham prison, which informs readers that prisoners receive only two 
meals a day (11).  What remains significant from Beehov’s representation is that this food restriction 
                                                 
21 William White. “Extracts and Remarks on the Subject of Punishment and Reformation of Criminals,” The American Museum. 
(Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, 1790.)  Text references are to page numbers of this 
edition. 
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disappears when an inmate falls ill. In his fourth point of his “Rules and Regulations,” Beehov’s prison 
allows for “the [prison] physician” to deviate from the strict menu, and select the sustenance necessary 
to keep an inmate alive.  
This duty to provide for inmates’ medical needs, albeit minimally and only in the most urgent 
cases, follows as a necessity for prisons to develop criminals as tools for profit.  Beehov discusses 
male prisoners that cut “logwood for the dryers,” while the females learned how to “beat, heckle, and 
weave hemp” (12). All together, the goods produced by prisoners generated a monetary surplus, as 
“both the tow and the yarn” were sold to local businesses.  Beehov writes, “we had the satisfaction to 
find, that the money arising from the earnings of prisoners…was more than double the sum expected 
for their maintenance” (13). In this way, Beehov offers prisons as profitable places of business where 
criminals benefit from gaining work ethic and the institution benefits from lowering costs.  Here, the 
prisoner is unethically valued more for their potential as an economic producer than as a rational 
member of society. 
This concept of a prison as a place that generates profits through prisoner work arises again in 
John Howard’s included letter on Oxfordsville prison.   This letter shows an audience how the profits 
generated from labor outweighed the cost of housing prisoners, thus legitimizing prison as an 
economically-viable option.  Specifically, Howard’s letter centers on a diagram calculating the 
expenses for all prisoners and the profits generated, in which their “total earnings” amounted to 
₤19,811. The diagram lists “expense in bread,” “clothes,” and “materials for work,” as expenses 
offsetting earnings, with a final net profit of ₤2001 ½ in 1786 (19). This substantial profit though, did 
not reach the prisoners upon their leaving.   Howard writes that “some prisoners, when they are 
discharged, are completely clothed, have a little money in their pockets, and a good character given 
them…” (19). Thus, good behavior during punishment within the prison is rewarded by inculcating 
13 
 
intrinsic morality and “good character” through disciplinary labor, rather than through receiving the 
proceeds of that labor.   
Here, there exists an ethical problem in this representation of good behavior in prison. This 
representation assumes that criminality is innate in the criminal, and not influenced whatsoever by the 
circumstances a criminal finds his or herself in, whether those circumstances. By believing good 
behavior comes about through labor, the legal system neglects the potential that criminals will return to 
the system because of the bleak situations awaiting them. Certainly, both reformers want criminals to 
leave prison with a good character and conscience.  Yet, Behoov’s and Howard’s desire for economic 
incentives in imprisonment posit the criminal as simply a tool for economic gain.  The unethical 
motive arises in the reformers not realizing the need for a criminal to leave prison with the funds and 
potential for a standard of living that can sustain the good character developed in prison. Without this, 
a criminal like Wieland returns to a bleak situation perpetuating a cycle of criminality. 
Additionally, the problem ignores a character like Wieland and his mental incompetency.  This 
incompetency disables him from being able to work.  Moreover, the physical restrictions he faces as a 
mentally incompetent criminal alienate him. In Chapter XXI, Clara’s uncle Mr. Cambridge notes “his 
[Wieland’s] chains, and the watchfulness of his guards,” as always increasing.22 This restriction only 
seems to limit Wieland’s agency in the prison, causing him to escape. Advising his niece not to visit 
Wieland in prison, Mr. Cambridge states, “you will discover that your duty lies in carefully shunning 
him.” 23 Thus, the prison model cannot attend to the needs of Wieland, as the mentally-ill are thought 
to be untamable, irreversibly corrupt, and hence, meant to be shunned. Mr. Cambridge’s final 
statement in his conversation with Clara indicates Wieland’s only option as death.  “There is no hope 
that his malady will end but with his life,” Cambridge insists (214).  .  
 
                                                 
22 Brown, Wieland, 215. 
23 Ibid., 214. 
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IV. The Ethics of Self-Inflicted Punishment 
Based on Mr. Cambridge’s assertion, and because neither of the two previous models presented 
can deal with Wieland, his only other viable option seems to be to harm himself, thus impeding his 
violent tendencies and the harm he causes to society. In Chapter XXVI, Wieland’s suicide affirms the 
unethical motives behind the novel’s punishment models. He cannot be put to death due to the negative 
ways this reflects on a society.  Moreover, his presence in prison is useless, as he cannot be 
rehabilitated or work to generate profit.  Thus, it is Wieland’s self-inflicted punishment that provides 
relief for the characters, and the novel’s society as a whole.  
 However, even an act such as suicide, which physically harmed no one else, received 
punishment from the Early Republic legal system. This punishment for self-harm results from the same 
motive for abolishing capital punishment—a desire to deter the development of an uncivilized societal 
reputation. Published in 1771, Chapter 14 of Judge William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, confronts suicide as a “double offense” that is both an offense to God and the social 
contract.
24
  Blackstone, considered by scholars as the most important legal authority in English 
common law tradition, claims that the self-murderer must be “in his senses”—a fact clearly not 
demonstrated by Wieland in his testimony (190).  
Further, Blackstone states that the law can only inflict punishment on what the self-murder 
leaves behind.  He defines this as a man’s “reputation and fortune” (189). Blackstone provides options 
to the government for how to humiliate the suicide victim, including disrespectfully burying the victim 
on the side of a deserted highway or fining his family (190). Additionally, Blackstone explains how a 
suicidal man’s land should be given to the government after his death, thus preventing the wife from 
inheriting it. Thus, we see this punishment of the suicidal victim’s reputation as paralleling the motive 
for abolishing capital punishment. Punishing suicide serves to enhance the society’s reputation as one 
                                                 
24 William Blackstone.  Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Book IV, Chapter 14. (Philadelphia, PA: Robert Bell of 
Philadelphia, 1771). Text references are to page numbers of this edition. 
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strongly rooted in morality and religion—a valued reputation in this period. However, for Wieland, 
only his relationships to Clara and Carwin remain at the novel’s end.  
Complicating the situation further, these characters aid in Wieland’s suicide. In the final scene, 
it is Carwin who first tells Wieland, “Cease to cherish they delusion…thy senses have misled thee to 
commit these acts.”25 It can be argued then, that Carwin deserves punishment as he is the first to tell 
Wieland that it is his own free will, and not divine contact, which is responsible for the murders. 
Moreover, Clara’s passive dropping of the knife seems to assist Wieland’s suicide after Carwin 
supplies him with the truth.  She offers herself as passive and potentially responsible for the suicide 
act, noting that “when my thoughts became engaged by his [Wieland’s] demeanor, my fingers were 
stretched as by a mechanical force…”26 When considering this final scene in light of Blackstone’s text, 
the scene forces ambiguity on the reader, as the audience does not know who is responsible for murder. 
 
V.  Reevaluating the Ethics and Motives of Punishment 
This ambiguity in culpability for the suicide leads to one outcome—one in which the audience 
recognizes a larger ethical ambiguity engendered by the motives underlying each punishment model.  
First, the novel’s society appears to condone punishment based on inaccurate public opinion. This 
public opinion manifests in unreliable third-party narration. As much as it serves to protect society, 
punishment also seems motivated by the need for a society to construct a ‘civilized’ representation, and 
to bolster economic success.  Considering Wieland’s treatment through the lens of other texts, an 
audience recognizes unethical motives behind the novel’s punishment models that parallel motives in 
our own society.  This recognition can engender empowering new thoughts about two aspects—first, 
the influence of public opinion on criminals and secondly, the growth of for-profit prisons in our 
nation.  
                                                 
25 Brown. Wieland, 262. 
26 Ibid., 264. 
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First, once a criminal is released from imprisonment, discriminatory policies place further 
restrictions on ex-felons. Specifically, many business’s hiring policies regarding ex-felons raise 
contemporary ethical problems and questions about what outcomes our justice system desires for 
criminals after their release. These discriminatory practices from the same concept of punishment by 
public opinion as presented in Wieland.  Although formal punishment may end, public opinion 
engenders a clear stigma on the criminal as an insensible, poorly performing, and disruptive employee 
not worth the economic investment or risk.  
Secondly, this recognition of a parallel with the novel can also aid in understanding the recent 
popularity of privately-owned, for-profit prisons in our country.  Providing discipline through labor 
ignores the development of skills necessary for offenders to end their criminality, and sets up offenders 
for reoffending.  Although labor can serve to inculcate good character, there remains a need to improve 
access to educational resources rather than relying on labor. To profit from prisoners through labor 
then, is everything but ethical.   Thus, if a society continues to accept crime as unexplainable like Anna 
does in Yates’ account, punishes based on hearsay or evidence from unreliable source, and punishes to 
enhance its reputation and economy, that society will guide its people towards losing a sense of human 
dignity and ethics—a type of societal self-destruction similar to Wieland’s own demise.   
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